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Abstract. We present a framework for reasoning about secrecy in a class of
Diffie-Hellman protocols. The technique, which shares a conceptual origin with
the idea of a rank function, uses the notion of a message-template to determine
whether a given value is generable by an intruder in a protocol model. Tradition-
ally, the rich algebraic structure of Diffie-Hellman messages has made it difficult
to reason about such protocols using formal, rather than complexity-theoretic,
techniques. We describe the approach in the context of the MTI A(0) protocol,
and derive the conditions under which this protocol can be considered secure.
1 Introduction
Formal protocol analysis techniques have a simplicity which is due, in part, to
the high level of abstraction at which they operate. Such abstractions are justified
since any attack discovered at the abstract level will tend to be preserved in a
more concrete model. In general, however, failure to discover an attack does not
imply correctness, and in seeking to establish correctness we must be mindful
of the assumptions on which our abstractions are based.
Protocols based on the Diffie-Hellman scheme [7] present an interesting
verification challenge since, in this context, we cannot assume such an abstract
view of cryptography. Certain algebraic properties (such as the homomorphism
of exponentiation in (gx)y = (gy)x) must be represented for the protocol to reach
its functional goal, and other properties (such as the cancellation of multiplica-
tive inverses) must also be considered if we wish to prove a meaningful se-
curity result. As a consequence, such protocols have tended to be evaluated in
complexity-theoretic models (see [4], for example) which aim to reduce the cor-
rectness of the protocol to some well-defined hard problem, such as the com-
putation of discrete logarithms in a finite field. The resulting proofs tend to be
difficult to conduct and evaluate, and a small change in the protocol will often
require an entirely new proof to be constructed.
With some exceptions [11,12,1] formal techniques have been slow in rising
to the challenge of Diffie-Hellman. This paper presents a theorem-proving ap-
proach to the verification of a class of Diffie-Hellman protocols. Although our
rA,rB,rC Random integers, chosen by A, B and C respectively
tA, tB Ephemeral public-keys, tA = grA , tB = grB
xA,xB,xC Private long-term keys of A, B and C respectively
yA,yB Public keys of A and B: yA = gxA , yB = gxB
ZAB The shared secret between A and B
x ∈R X An element x chosen at random from the set X
Fig. 1. Protocol notation
approach is quite general we present it in the context of the MTI A(0) protocol
of Matsumoto, Takashima and Imai [10]. This protocol is chosen for the sim-
plicity of its messages and non-standard use of Diffie-Hellman (in particular,
the computation of a shared key as gx · gy = gx+y). Some of the MTI protocols
satisfy an interesting property — which we call I/O-independence — that en-
ables us to model the protocols at a very abstract level. The protocols and the
concept of I/O-independence are described in Section 2. Our model revolves
around the idea of a message-template which, suitably instantiated, can repre-
sent any value that an intruder can deduce (under a defined set of capabilities).
A particular value remains secret if it cannot be realised via any instantiation
of the message-template. This model, and its associated definition of secrecy, is
described in Section 3 and applied to the MTI A(0) protocol in Section 4. Al-
though we do not describe it in such language, our approach shares a conceptual
origin with the notion of a rank function [13], and is informed by the approach
of Pereira and Quisquater [12]; we explore these relationships, and conclude, in
Section 5.
2 The MTI protocols
Three infinite classes of authenticated key agreement protocols fall under the
banner of MTI [10]. All of the MTI protocols appear amenable to analysis in
our framework but, in this paper, we focus on one particular protocol, A(0). The
protocol combines long-term and ephemeral key contributions to provide au-
thentication in the Diffie-Hellman scheme. A summary of notation, following
[3], is given in Figure 1. In protocol A(0) (Figure 2) principal A (who wishes
to establish a shared-secret with B) generates a long-term secret, xA, and pub-
lishes the corresponding public-key yA = gxA . B does the same with xB and yB.
A randomly chooses rA, computes zA = grA and sends it to B. In response, B
randomly chooses rB, computes zB = grB and sends it to A. B then computes
ZAB = zxBA y
rB
A = (g
rA)xB · (gxA)rB = grAxB+xArB and A computes ZAB = grBxA+xBrA .
The protocol aims to convince each principal that no one, aside from the other
A B
rA ∈R Zq
zA = grA
zA−−−−→ rB ∈R Zq
zB = grB
ZAB = zxAB y
rA
B
zB←−−−− ZAB = zxBA yrBA
Fig. 2. MTI A(0) protocol
protocol participant, can learn the shared-secret ZAB. This property is often
termed implicit key authentication; here we simply refer to it as secrecy.
All of the MTI protocols involve the exchange of two messages, zA and
zB, each of which is computed within the principal and not as a function of a
previously received message. (Contrast this with protocols like Cliques, where
a principal B may receive an input m from A, apply some function to m and
send the result on to C.) We capture this notion in the property of Input/Output-
independence:
Definition 1. In a Diffie-Hellman protocol a principal P is I/O-independent if P
does not transmit any message which is dependent on the value of a previously
received message.
We say that a protocol is I/O-independent if every honest principal is I/O-
independent.
Proposition 1. Protocol A(0) is I/O-independent.
We will see in the next section that the property of I/O-independence enables us
to model protocols at a very abstract level.
3 A model for I/O-independent Diffie-Hellman protocols
In this section we present a model for I/O-independent protocols based around
the idea of a message-template which defines the general form of any message
generable by an intruder in a given protocol.
We begin by noting that transmitted messages are elements of some group
G in which the Decisional Diffie-Hellman problem is believed to be hard. A
generator g of G is agreed by all principals and there exists an identity element
1 such that 1 · x = 1, for all x ∈ G. We assume that elements of G can be ex-
pressed as g raised to the power of a sum of products of random numbers. This
assumption permits, for example, gxy+z, where x, y and z are random numbers,
but excludes values such as g(gx) since the exponent is itself a group element.
The users of the system therefore manipulate two types of element, (i) random
exponents, and (ii) powers of g, and we assume that only the latter will be sent
on the network.
3.1 The intruder
We divide the users of the system into a set of honest principals, {A,B}, who
will always adhere to the protocol, and a malevolent intruder, C, whose goal is
to subvert the protocol.
Some elements of (i) (from above) will be known initially to the intruder
(such as random numbers he has chosen himself), and some elements of (ii)
will become known to the intruder during the course of the protocol. The I/O-
independent nature of the protocols means that an active intruder cannot influ-
ence any of the values sent by honest participants, since the functions which
produce these values are not dependent on any external input. This is important,
since it is then sufficient to assume that the intruder knows these values from the
start.
Following [12], we divide the intruder’s initial knowledge into a set E of
exponents and a set P of known powers of g, where x ∈ P indicates knowledge
of gx but not of x (unless x ∈ E). We then define the computations that the
intruder can perform
Definition 2 (intruder capabilities). Given a set P of initially known powers
of g and a set E of initially known exponents, the intruder can grow P based on
the following operations:
1. given m1 ∈ P and m2 ∈ P add m1+m2 to P
2. given m ∈ P and n ∈ E add mn, m(n−1) to P
3. given m ∈ P add −m to P
In other words, we allow the intruder to (1) compute gm1 · gm1 = gm1+m2 given
knowledge of gm1 and gm2 , (2) compute the exponentiations (gm)n, (gm)n−1 given
knowledge of gm and n, and (3) compute the inverse 1gm = g−m given gm. More-
over, these capabilities can be combined:
Example 1. Suppose that P = {1,rA} and E = {rC}. The intruder can deduce
(i) −rA ∈ P by rule 3 from rA, (ii) 1rC ∈ P by rule 2 and −rA+1rC ∈ P by rule
1 from (i) and (ii), representing the computation of grC−rA .
Crucially, the intruder is not able to use m1 ∈ P and m2 ∈ P to deduce m1m2.
In this model, the intruder’s entire knowledge can be defined as the closure of
P under the deductions of Definition 2 and set E. In any useful protocol, E and
P will initially be non-empty, and the resulting knowledge sets will be infinite.
For this reason, it will be infeasible to enumerate these sets by growing P via
successive application of rules 1–3.
3.2 System definition
An examination of the sorts of values that can be deduced by an intruder leads to
the following observation: a generable value can be written as some number of
elements of P multiplied by some product of (possibly inverted) elements from
E. For instance, the value derived in Example 1 can be written as −1(rA)(r0C)+
1(1)(r1C) (noting the difference between the group identity 1 and the integer 1).
In fact, we can go further by defining a polynomial over the variables of E and
P which represents any value generable by the intruder using rules 1–3, above.
Definition 3. Let F be a finite family of functions that map elements of E to
integer powers: F ⊆ f in E→ Z.
Given E = {xC}, for example, we may define F = {{xC 7→ −1}}.
Definition 4. Let h be a higher-order function which, for a member of F, maps
elements of P to integers:h : F → (P→ Z).
As an example, given P = {rA} and F = {{xC 7→ −1}}, we might choose to
define h({xC 7→ −1}) = {rA 7→ 1}.
Definition 5 (message-template). Fix some E and P. Then:
v(F,h) = ∑
f∈F
(
∑
p∈P
h f ,p · p
)(
∏
e∈E
e fe
)
We call v the message-template for a system defined by E and P. Intuition is
little help here, so consider a simple example:
Example 2. Given the system defined by P= {rA} and E = {xC}, consider how
the value g−rAx−1C +5rAxC can be expressed. P and E result in the following poly-
nomial:
v(F,h) = ∑
f∈F
(
h f ,rA · x
fxC
C
)
To express a particular generable value we must define F and h. Recall that F
is a family of functions. Suppose that F = {{xC 7→ −1},{xC 7→ 0},{xC 7→ 1}},
then we have:
v(F,h) = (h{xC 7→−1},rA · x−1C )+(h{xC 7→0},rA · x0C)+(h{xC 7→1},rA · x1C)
Finally, suppose that h is defined such that h({xC 7→ −1}) = {rA 7→ 1},
h({xC 7→ 0}) = {rA 7→ 0} and h({xC 7→ 1}) = {rA 7→ 5}. This results in:
v(F,h) = (−1 · rA) · (x−1C )+(0 · rA) · (x0C)+(5 · rA)(x1C)
which is the value −rAx−1C +5rAxC.
As a more complex example, consider the following:
Example 3. Let P = {1,rA,rB}, E = {xC,rC}. Then:
v(F,h) = ∑
f∈F
(h f ,1 ·1+h f ,rA · rA+h f ,rB · rB)
(
x
fXC
C · r
frC
C
)
In this polynomial, the value grC−rA from Example 1 can be represented by defin-
ing:
F = {{xC 7→ 0,rC 7→ 0},{xC 7→ 0,rC 7→ 1}}
and h such that:
h({xC 7→ 0,rC 7→ 0}) = {1 7→ 0,rA 7→ −1,rB 7→ 0}
h({xC 7→ 0,rC 7→ 1}) = {1 7→ 1,rA 7→ 0,rB 7→ 0}
We then obtain: v(F,h) = (0 · 1+−1 · rA + 0 · rB)(x0C · r0C)+ (1 · 1+ 0 · rA +
0 · rB)(x0C · r1C) =−rA+ rC.
As stated, our intention is that, for a given system (defined by E and P),
the polynomial v(F,h) expresses the general form of all values deducible by
an intruder, from P and E, by appeal to the deduction rules of Definition 2.
We embed the ability of a polynomial to take a certain value in the concept of
realisability:
Definition 6. A value m is realisable (written realisable(m)) if there exists func-
tions F and h such that v(F,h) = m.
That is, a value m is realisable if there exists a solution to the equation v(F,h)−
m= 0. If m is not realisable we write ¬realisable(m). Define Pub to be a closure
containing all possible polynomials for a given system. Pub is the set containing
all realisable values of that system: the set of public messages.
Theorem 1 (Faithfulness). Fix some P and E and Pub as defined above. Pub
is closed under the deductions of Definition 2.
Proof. By induction. For the base case we show that, whenever p ∈ P, p is
realisable.
Base case: Given some p ∈ P, p is realisable with v(F,h) by defining
F = {{e 7→ 0 | e ∈ E}}
and:
h({e 7→ 0 | e ∈ E}) = {p 7→ 1}∪{q 7→ 0 | q ∈ P\{p}}
Inductive step: There are three cases, corresponding to the three intruder
deduction rules: (i) realisable(m1)∧ realisable(m2) =⇒ realisable(m1+m2),
(ii) realisable(m1)∧n ∈ E =⇒ realisable(m1n)∧ realisable(m1n−1), and (iii)
realisable(m1) =⇒ realisable(−m1).
(i) Assume m1 = v(F1,h1) and m2 = v(F2,h2). Then m1 +m2 is realisable
with v(F3,h3) by defining F3 = F1∪F2 and h such that:
h3( f ) =

h1( f ) if f ∈ dom(h1)\dom(h2)
h2( f ) if f ∈ dom(h2)\dom(h1)
λp.h1( f )(p)+h2( f )(p) if f ∈ dom(h1)∩dom(h2)
(ii) For the first conjunct assume m1 = v(F1,h1) and n ∈ E. Then, m1n is
realisable with v(F2,h2) by defining:
F2 = { f ⊕{n 7→ (F1(n)+1)} | f ∈ F1}
and h2 such that:
h2( f ) = h1( f ⊕{n 7→ ( f (n)−1)})
The second conjunct follows the above, with addition in place of the sub-
traction in the definition of h2.
(iii) Assume m1 = v(F1,h1). Then −m1 is realisable with v(F1,h2) where h2
is defined such that h2( f )(p) =−(h1( f )(p)).
uunionsq
Our intention is for the model to respect the fact that some values are im-
possible for an intruder to guess. We achieve this by assuming that the variables
(rA, xC etc.) are symbolic, that each is distinct from all others, and that the set of
variables is disjoint from the set of integers.
Assumption 1 (P∪E)∩Z= /0
The following example makes clear why this restriction is necessary:
Example 4. Consider the system defined by P = {1} andE = {xC}. If variables
are numbers, then any group value gX can be realised by defining X = v(F,h),
where F = {{xC 7→ 0}} and h({xC 7→ 0}) = {1 7→ X}, yielding v(F,h) = (1 ·
X)x0C = X .
Assumption 1 means that, for the group identity 1, we have that 1 /∈ Z and, in
particular, 1 6= 1. However, we grant special privileges to the group identity such
that 1 ·m = m, for all m. Note that an element n ∈ E \P will typically only be
realisable if 1 ∈ P. That is, n is realisable by v(F,h), where F = {{n 7→ 1}} and
h({n 7→ 1}) = {1 7→ 1}, giving 1 · (1 ·n1) = n.
Condition 1 1 ∈ P =⇒ P∩E = /0
We require that the above condition be true of any protocol model. To see
why this is necessary consider the system given by E = {xC}, P = {1,xC}.
The value xC can be realised in two ways, xC = v(F,h1) = v(F,h2), where
F = {{xC 7→ 0},{xC 7→ 1}}, and h1, h2 are defined such that:
– h1({xC 7→ 0}) = {1 7→ 0,xC 7→ 1}, h1({xC 7→ 1}) = {1 7→ 0,xC 7→ 0}
– h2({xC 7→ 0}) = {1 7→ 0,xC 7→ 0}, h2({xC 7→ 1}) = {1 7→ 1,xC 7→ 0}
The first case yields v(F,h1) = (xC)x0C +(0)x1C = xC and the second results in
v(F,h2) = (0)x0C+(1)x1C = xC. Since h1 6= h2, but v(F,h1) = v(F,h2), the exam-
ple allows the same value to be derived in two separate ways.
3.3 Secrecy
In a Diffie-Hellman protocol, a principal u performs some key computation
function on an input z to derive a secret Zuv believed to be shared with v. We
denote this function kuv with Zuv = kuv(z).
Example 5. In the standard Diffie-Hellman protocol [7], a principal A, appar-
ently running with B and using the ephemeral secret xA performs the key com-
putation kAB(z) = zxArepresenting the shared secret ZAB = gzxA .
Definition 7 (Secrecy). Given a system defined by E and P, a key computation
function k maintains secrecy iff:
∀m.realisable(m) =⇒ ¬realisable(k(m))
Intuitively, secrecy is defined as an anti-closure property of the set of generable
values: the result of applying k to a realisable value should never result in a
realisable value. If this property does not hold then an intruder will possess two
values, x and y, such that, if x is sent to some principal she will compute y,
wrongly believing it to be secret.
4 Reasoning about the MTI A(0) protocol
A complete model of an I/O-independent protocol is a combination of the message-
template with an appropriate key computation function. In this section we present
a model of the MTI A(0) protocol and use it to deduce the conditions under
which the protocol guarantees the secrecy of a shared key.
Define EA(0) = {rC,xC}, PA(0) = {1,rA,rB,xA,xB}, representing a run of
the MTI A(0) protocol. We wish to show that the key computation function
kA(0)ab (z) = zxa+ xbra maintains secrecy. There are eight cases to consider:
1. a = A∧b =C 5. a = A∧b = A
2. a = B∧b =C 6. a = B∧b = B
3. a =C∧b = A 7. a = A∧b = B
4. a =C∧b = B 8. a = B∧b = A
We treat each in turn.
Cases 1–4
Let a = A and b =C. We are trying to show that, for any z where realisable(z),
¬realisable(kA(0)AC (z)). There exists some F1 and h1 such that v(F1,h1) = z. If we
can find some F2 and h2 such that v(F2,h2) = kA(0)AC (z) we will have shown that
kA(0)AC (z) is realisable and is therefore, not secret.
Note that kA(0)AC (z) = zxA + xCrA is a linear combination, and that the linear
combination will be realisable if each of its components is realisable. In gen-
eral zxA will be realisable if z does not mention xA (since xA ∈ P but xA /∈ E).
Consider, then, z = rC, given by v(F1,h1) where:
F1 = {{rC 7→ 1}}
h1({rC 7→ 1}) = {1 7→ 1}∪{p 7→ 0 | p ∈ P\{1}}
then zxA = rCxA is realisable by v(F1,h3) where h3({rC 7→ 1}) = {xA 7→ 1}.
Similarly, xCrA is realisable by v(F3,h4), where:
F3 = {{xC 7→ 1}}
h4({xC 7→ 1}) = {rA 7→ 1}∪{p 7→ 0 | p ∈ P\{rA}}
Theorem 1 then tells us that, since realisable(rCxA) and realisable(xCrA), the
sum rCxA+ xCrA is also realisable, and is given by v(F2,h2), where:
F2 = F1∪F3 = {{rC 7→ 1},{xC 7→ 1}}
h2({rC 7→ 1}) = {xA 7→ 1}∪{p 7→ 0 | p ∈ P\{xA}}
h2({xC 7→ 1}) = {rA 7→ 1}∪{p 7→ 0 | p ∈ P\{rA}}
From this we conclude that the intruder can deduce a pair of values, rC and
rCxA+xCrA, related by the key computation function kA(0)AC , and so secrecy fails.
This failure should come as no surprise since b = C represents the intruder’s
legitimate participation in the protocol. Any honest principal who willingly en-
gages in a protocol run with the intruder cannot hope to maintain secrecy of the
resulting session-key. We note that similar conclusions can be reached in cases
2–4.
Cases 5 and 6 (b = a)
Let a = A, b = A. The corresponding key computation is given by kA(0)AA (z) =
zxA + xArA. Note that xArA is the multiplication of two elements from P. The
intruder model only allows the addition of elements from P and, since xA /∈ E
and rA /∈ E, the component xArA is unrealisable. Consequently, for zxA + xArA
to be realisable, zxA must be a linear combination that includes −xArA (since
−xArA + xArA = 0 is realisable). Consider the simplest case, where z = −rA,
which is realisable, since rA ∈ P. The result of kA(0)AA (−rA) = −rAxA + xArA = 0
is realisable by v(F5,h5), where, for instance:
F5 = {{rC 7→ 0},{xC 7→ 0}}
h5({rC 7→ 0}) = {p 7→ 0 | p ∈ P}
h5({rC 7→ 0}) = {p 7→ 0 | p ∈ P}
As a result, the intruder can deduce a pair of values −rA and 0 such that 0 =
kA(0)AA (−rA) and, again, secrecy fails. A similar result holds for case 6, where a=
b = B. This attack is a simpler version of one discovered by Just and Vaudenay
[9] and described by Boyd and Mathuria [3]. In the original attack, z was set
to be rC − rA and the resulting session-key computed as gxArC (where xArC is
realisable). The attack depends on the willingness of A to engage in the protocol
with someone claiming her identity, and can be seen as stipulating a condition on
an implementation: namely, that a principal should only engage in the protocol
if the other party has a distinct identity.
Cases 7 and 8 (b 6= a)
For the final cases, assume a= A and b= B (a similar result holds for a= B and
b = A). The key computation is given by kA(0)AB (z) = zxA + xBrA. For secrecy to
fail there must exist some z = v(F1,h1) and kA(0)AB (z) = v(F2,h2) such that:
v(F1,h1) · xA+ xBrA = v(F2,h2)
Consider the coefficient of x0Cr0C. We have:
h2({xC 7→ 0,rC 7→ 0}) = {1 7→ n1,rA 7→ n2,rB 7→ n3,xA 7→ n4,xB 7→ n5}
h1({xC 7→ 0,rC 7→ 0}) = {1 7→ m1,rA 7→ m2,rB 7→ m3,xA 7→ m4,xB 7→ m5}
for some m1 . . .m5 ∈ Z, n1 . . .n5 ∈ Z where the coefficients on both sides are the
same:
m1xA+m2rAxA+m3rBxA+m4x2A+m5xBxA+ xBrA
=
n1+n2rA+n3rB+n4xA+n5xB
By assumption we have that variables are symbolic and that a given symbol x
is distinct from all others. Specifically, we note that xBrA is distinct from all
other terms on either side of the equation and, therefore, there are no values of
the coefficients which enable the equality to be met. We conclude that, for any
realisable z, kA(0)AB (z) is unrealisable.
Results
The analysis enables us to state the following result:
Theorem 2. Given EA(0) = {rC,xC}, PA(0) = {1,rA,rB,xA,xB},
a 6=C∧b 6=C∧a 6= b =⇒ kA(0)ab maintains secrecy
uunionsq
This tells us that protocol A(0) maintains the secrecy of the session-key
precisely when the initiator and responder are distinct entities and neither of
them is the intruder C.
5 Discussion
5.1 The link with rank functions
Although we have not described our approach in such terms, it shares a con-
ceptual origin with the notion of a rank function. In the context of protocol
verification, a rank function describes an invariant property of a system [13].
This property will define the sorts of messages that may pass through the sys-
tem, crucially distinguishing certain values that should remain secret. The rank
function effectively partitions the message-space of a protocol by assigning a
rank of pub to public and sec to secret messages. Traditionally a rank function
is defined over the message-space of a protocol model expressed in the process
algebra CSP [14], and a central rank theorem gives a series of proof obliga-
tions on the rank function whose achievement allows us to conclude that only
messages of rank pub ever appear on the network. Previous work has applied the
rank function approach in the context of Diffie-Hellman protocols [6]. However,
a fundamental difficulty with this approach is the necessity to statically assign
a rank to messages. It is interesting to note that the present work side-steps this
issue by defining (via the message-template) the set Pub of public messages.
This set corresponds to the set of messages assigned a rank of pub by the rank
approach.1
5.2 Pereira and Quisquater’s approach
Recently, Pereira and Quisquater [12] developed a formal model of the Cliques
conference key agreement protocols [2], based on linear logic, and discovered
attacks on each of the claimed security properties. In the model, secrecy is de-
fined as the inability of an intruder to discover a pair of values (gx,gy) such that,
if a principal is sent gx, he will compute the key gy. Values are assumed to take
the form of g raised to a product of exponents, and secrecy becomes the inability
of an intruder to learn a pair of messages separated by the ratio y
x
. The model
allows the intruder to grow a set of known ratios, in the hope that some secret
ratio(s) remain unobtainable. This ratio-centric view of secrecy seems partic-
ularly natural for Diffie-Hellman exchanges, and our initial attempts at mod-
elling the MTI protocols sought to embrace this approach. However, it turns
out that this view of secrecy does not generalise in the obvious way. Consider,
for example, a value z in the A(0) protocol, and the key computation function
kA(0)ab (z) = zxa + xbra. The ratio between k
A(0)
ab (z) and z — xa +
xbra
z — is still in
terms of z, due to the presence of addition in the exponents. This fact makes it
difficult to derive the set of secret ratios, since a ratio cannot be stated without
recourse to the argument to the key computation function. The present work can
be viewed as an attempt to provide a more general view of Diffie-Hellman key
computation.
In a different respect, Pereira’s and Quisquater’s model is more general than
ours, since it applies to protocols which fail to satisfy the property of I/O-
independence. This property, recall, tells us that no user of the protocol ever
sends out any message which is dependent on a previously received message.
In the Cliques protocols, protocol participants tend to receive a message, per-
form some computation on that message and send out the result. Pereira and
1 In fact, Pub is similar to Heather’s concept of a minimal rank function [8].
Quisquater call such user operations services.2 These services are encoded in
terms of the values added to the exponent of an incoming message. For in-
stance, a principal may receive a message gx and generate and send the message
gxyz (where y and z are known to that principal). The intruder can then (with
some restrictions) use the principal as an oracle, enabling him to send a spu-
rious message gc and receive gcyz in return. The fact that the property of I/O-
independence does not allow such services to be expressed in our model is not a
fundamental limitation but a restriction which enables us to describe our work in
a clean manner. One could envisage weakening this assumption by internalising
such services in the intruder (in the style of Broadfoot and Roscoe[5]) where,
for example, the multiplication of a value with yz is encoded as an additional
intruder deduction. The message-template would need to be redesigned to ac-
count for these additional capabilities. In contrast to the present work, such a
message-template would tend to be protocol specific.
5.3 Conclusion and further work
We have presented a framework for reasoning about secrecy in a class of Diffie-
Hellman protocols, and demonstrated the approach by a consideration of se-
crecy in the MTI A(0) protocol. The work hinges around the idea of a message-
template, an object which defines, in a highly abstract way, the values that can
be deduced by an intruder under a given set of capabilities. A protocol model is
given as a combination of a message-template and a function representing the
key computation applied by a principal to derive a shared secret.
This work is nascent, but we are currently applying it to other protocols,
both within and without the MTI suite. This requires us to relax the condition of
I/O-independence and widen our model to address situations in which protocol
participants provide services. In many cases, this extension appears straightfor-
ward. The ad hoc nature of the secrecy proof in Section 4 is unfortunate, and it
would be useful to derive a general framework for such proof (as is achieved in
[12], for instance). There also appears to be interesting links between the idea
of a message-template and the concept of ideal used within the strand space ap-
proach [15]. Future work will investigate whether this correspondence enables
us to deduce general principles with which a protocol can be proven correct.
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